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Abstract
Nanotechnology offers a rare opportunity to study the early evolution of a new generic technology in real time. This
paper suggests focusing more on the market formation side, rather than technology generation, when seeking to explain
technology evolution. Applying an evolutionary capabilities perspective, the paper examines how firms organize
innovation in the early embryonic stages of a technology and how the market as a selective device undergoes qualitative
change as part of economic evolution.  The traditional Danish window chain is used as a case. A model of
nanotechnology evolution is proposed which suggests that nanotechnology commercialization is significantly driven by
small and medium-sized firms based on their internal knowhow, with larger firms as important suppliers of know how.
These smaller firms are adept at addressing social needs which appear to be key factors in the nano-commercialization
process. A taxonomy of nine enterprise strategies for entry into nanotechnology is suggested. The paper identifies a
marked shift in marketing strategizing among the nanotechnology innovative companies, from being ?loud? around the
turn of the millennium to becoming increasingly ?silent? at the present time, illustrating the unconsolidated stage of the
current nanotechnology market. 
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Abstract: Nanotechnology offers a rare opportunity to study the early evolution of a new 
generic technology in real time. This paper suggests focusing more on the market formation side, 
rather than technology generation, when seeking to explain technology evolution. Applying an 
evolutionary capabilities perspective, the paper examines how firms organize innovation in the 
early embryonic stages of a technology and how the market as a selective device undergoes 
qualitative change as part of economic evolution.  The traditional Danish window chain is used 
as a case. A model of nanotechnology evolution is proposed which suggests that nanotechnology 
commercialization is significantly driven by small and medium-sized firms based on their 
internal knowhow, with larger firms as important suppliers of know how. These smaller firms are 
adept at addressing social needs which appear to be key factors in the nano-commercialization 
process. A taxonomy of nine enterprise strategies for entry into nanotechnology is suggested. 
The paper identifies a marked shift in marketing strategizing among the nanotechnology 
innovative companies, from being “loud” around the turn of the millennium to becoming 
increasingly “silent” at the present time, illustrating the unconsolidated stage of the current 
nanotechnology market.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Nanotechnology – although at a very infant stage of development – is associated with 
grand promises to become an important driver of global economic and social development 
(Royal Society, 2004; Nanoforum 2004; Aitken et al., 2006; NSET, 2009). It is a priority area in 
most countries, attracting huge investments globally (Lux, 2007; NSET, 2009). The development 
of nanotechnology offers a rare opportunity to study the early evolution of a new technology, 
possibly a technological revolution, in real time. Yet, little is known about the innovation 
dynamics of such early innovation stages. Nanotechnology is often defined as a “general purpose 
technology” by innovation researchers – a generic technology with enabling properties and 
pervasive impacts throughout the economy. It is anticipated that the future economic impacts of 
nanotechnology will be considerable (Bozeman et al. 2007; Youtie et al. 2008; Mangematin and 
Rieu, 2009). However, there is uncertainty as to how and when nanoscience will materialize into 
a distinct technology or economic sector (Delamarle et al. 2009; Laredo, Delamarle and Kahane, 
2010).  
Most innovation economic research into nanotechnology focuses on analyzing the time 
scales and innovation conditions in different phases of nanotechnology development (e.g. Meyer, 
2002; Rothermal and Thursby, 2007; Mangematin, 2008; Mangematin and Rieu, 2009; 
Delamarle et al. 2009; Mowery 2010, Islam and Miyazaki, 2010). This research is dominated by 
patent and bibliometric studies that focus on the input side (knowledge and technology 
generation) of the innovation process. On the other hand, the output side (commercialization and 
market formation aspects) is less well investigated (Shapira, Youtie and Kay, 2010).  
This paper seeks to inquire on the market formation side about the processes of 
innovation in nanotechnology. Applying an evolutionary capabilities perspective, it posits that 
valuable insights into the commercialization dynamics of embryonic innovation may be gained 
by looking into corporate strategizing among firms in supply chains oriented towards an 
emerging frontier technology. The analysis seeks to capture how interdependent but 
heterogeneous firms at different places in a supply chain respond to new technologically-driven 
profit opportunities.  
The construction sector has been chosen as the case, contributing to the limited research 
available on the role of traditional industries in nanotechnology development. A qualitative study 
is undertaken of how nanotechnologies enter into the window supply chain in the Danish market. 
The paper analyses both the strategies of firm entry along the nano-enabled window chain and 
the emergence of nanotechnology as a criterion in market selection. The empirical analysis 
focuses on two middle components of the window value chain: the core producers of glass and 
windows. The paper investigates the proposition that the hype is a distinct feature of 
nanotechnology that affects market formation.  
The paper proposes a model of nanotechnology evolution, arguing that nanotechnology 
commercialization is driven by small and medium sized firms based on their internal knowhow 
and by larger firms as important suppliers of knowhow. Smaller firms seem to be adept at 
sensing and addressing needs, which appear as key factors in the nanotechnology 
commercialization process. A taxonomy of nanotechnology business strategizing is elaborated, 
and there is discussion of the observed “silent” nature of nanotechnology innovation. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses theoretical 
considerations and hypotheses, including two current models of nanotechnology development. A 
third model (Nano III) is proposed. The third section introduces the window chain and the 
nanotechnology-active companies in the chain. In section 4, the main empirical analysis is 
presented. This is followed by sections (5 and 6) which respectively discuss nanotechnology 
entry strategizing and review the Nano III evolution model. Concluding comments are offered in 
section 7. 
 
2  Models of nanotechnology evolution  
 
According to theories of economic organization, a firm’s capabilities are the most significant 
factors in determining what will be done by the firm or the market (Penrose 1959; Richardson, 
1972). For generic and enabling technologies such as nanotechnology, this raises the research 
question of how different firms organize their innovation in the early embryonic stages when 
uncertainties are high as to the economic impacts and future trajectories of the technology. 
Potentially a wide spectrum of firms may benefit from a new generic technology, but who will 
be the early producers and users? 
Inspired by analyses of industry cycles and dominant designs (Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), a related question is whether nanotechnology evolution 
will follow similar development models as other general purpose technologies such as 
biotechnology and information and communications technologies (ICT) (Rothermal and 
Thursby, 2007; Mangematin, 2008; Mangematin and Rieu, 2009; Delamarle et al. 2009; Shapira, 
et al.; Mowery 2010). These earlier general purpose technologies exhibited different 
characteristics and were accompanied by different institutional frameworks. In ICT, emerging in 
the 1970s, innovative activities quickly centered around vertically-integrated firms in the evolved 
industry (the computer industry and wider electronics sector) associated with the emergence of 
“modular architectures” and stable interfaces with technological subsystems (Mowery 2010). On 
the other hand, in biotechnology, emerging in the 1980s, start-up firms played a catalytic role in 
initial developments, being important in linking up the new science base to incumbents firms 
(Laredo, et al., 2010).  
The emergence of nanotechnology, from the 1990s onwards, seems to follow a somewhat 
different pattern, although there is some disagreement among innovation researchers as to the 
observed pattern so far.  Contrasting models can be discerned. A first model (Model I), as 
represented by Laredo, et al., (2010) and in part by Shapira, et al., (2010), suggests that 
nanotechnology evolution is dominated by large (multinational) companies, underwritten by 
R&D and patent development,  and focused on markets. While Shapira, Youtie and Kay (2010) 
also argue that small firms play an important role for nanotechnology commercialization, they 
conclude that countries with more multinational firms, global start-ups and global research 
centers are more likely to shift from discovery to commercial applications in nanotechnology.  
A second model (Model II) is represented by Mowery (2010). He argues that the 
organization of nanotechnology resembles that of biotechnology, with universities and their spin 
offs playing prominent roles. In Model II, science-based technological advances and patenting, 
aided by patent-friendly environments found since the 1990s, also are central.  
Expectations of a grand nanotechnology revolution seem to be shared by both types of 
innovation observers. They each view nanotechnology as a new “wave” or megatrend with 
expected widespread effects on economic and social development (Mowery 2010; Laredo, et al., 
2010). However, these researchers also observe that nanotechnology commercialization is 
considerably slower than expected, despite continuous impressive public funding and massive 
growth rates in scientific publications globally. Patent activities and downstream applications 
remain somewhat limited, (Laredo, et al, 2010; Shapira, et al., 2010). Explanations for the slow 
rate of nanotechnology commercialization are lacking so far.  
 
2.1  A third model of nanotechnology development 
In this paper, a third model (Model III) of nanotechnology evolution is proposed which suggests 
nanotechnology commercialization is driven especially by small and medium sized firms based 
on their internal knowhow, with larger firms as important suppliers of knowledge. This model is 
explored through in-depth case studies. In contrast to the patent and bibliometric methods used in 
several of the studies mentioned above, a case study approach is especially adept at identifying 
internal and supply-chain knowledge relationships. The case studies show that firms engaged in 
Model III strategies are adept at identifying social needs and addressing these through 
nanotechnology commercialization.  
 Model III builds on evolutionary capabilities theory, adopting a strong systems 
perspective on nanotechnology evolution. Specifically, the analytical approach draws on the 
framework developed by Langlois and Robertson (1995) and Langlois (1992, 2003, 2004) which 
links micro-foundations (organizational and capability parameters) with aggregate market and 
institutional developments. The three pillars of this framework are:
1
 
 The distribution of existing capabilities in firm and market. Are existing capabilities 
distributed widely or contained primarily within the boundaries of large firms? 
 The systemic/autonomous nature of the economic change. Does the seizing of new 
profit opportunities require systemic reorganization of capabilities, including the 
learning of new capabilities, or can change proceed in an autonomous way?   
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 The framework as presented is slightly modified from Langlois, 2003 (p.360). 
 The level of market development. To what extent can required capabilities be tapped 
readily from the market, and to what extent must they be created from scratch? To 
what extent are relevant market-supporting institutions in place? 
In the following analysis, a major emphasis is placed on the third pillar, though probing 
how the early nanotechnology market evolves.  Key questions posed include: How do new 
nanotechnology selection properties and market-supporting institutions evolve?  Which firms 
construct the early market and what “dynamic transaction costs” are involved? (See also 
Langlois, 1992.)
2
  
It is also argued in the paper that nanotechnology commercialization is considerably 
influenced by hype – the advancement of exaggerated claims about the technology and its 
potential impacts. Nanotechnology is associated with distinctive forms of hype, related to its 
technological nature: the ability to manipulate nature at the fundamental atomic level leads to 
fantasizing and speculations both of grand opportunities and of significant risks and ethical 
perils. For nanotechnology, this leads to a paradox. On the one hand, there is extensive attention 
to the risks to environment and health from nanotechnology. Simultaneously, nanotechnology is 
seen as an important problem solver for those very issues (Andersen and Rasmussen, 2006). 
There are multiple reports and policy documents which point to the opportunities offered by 
nanotechnology to solve environmental problems and health issues, as well as other challenges, 
for example food supply (see: Nanoforum, 2004; Royal Society, 2004; Aitken et al., 2006; Elvin 
2007; Friends of the Earth Germany, 2007; Schmidt, 2007).  While hype and risk issues are 
much discussed in sociological analysis of nanotechnology, they have received limited attention 
in innovation economic research and hence we know little of their economic implications.   
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  “Dynamic transaction costs” are the inter-firm coordination costs which arise when a firm does not have the 
capabilities it needs when it needs them (Langlois, 1992, 2004). They are the costs of persuading or teaching actors 
with relational assets (suppliers or customers) what is necessary for a given innovation (Langlois, 1992). 
 3  The Danish window chain 
The following two sections investigate empirically how nanotechnologies enter into the window 
chain in Denmark. A qualitative study is presented of the nanotechnology strategies and 
innovation activities of core actors in the Danish window chain market. The Danish window 
chain comprises those firms active in Denmark in the market for windows, as well as their 
suppliers and customers. While most of these firms are headquartered in Denmark, international 
firms are also involved. The focus is on the middle of the value chain – the producers of glass 
and windows. These firms link with relevant (nano-active) suppliers and with customers in 
wholesale and retail trades.  Final customers (the users of windows) and overall trends in demand 
are addressed indirectly, drawing on evidence from interviewees in the supply chain. Table 1 
lists the main companies in the middle parts of the Danish window chain of relevance for 
nanotechnology development, with eight of these companies (as indicated in the table) forming 
the basis of the current study. The analysis is based on interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010, 
and also web-based information, secondary data, a national survey
3
, and earlier studies by the 
author on nanotechology, green nanotechnology and nano-enabled construction (see Andersen 
and Rasmussen, 2006; Andersen and Molin, 2007; Geiker and Andersen, 2009; Andersen and 
Geiker, 2009, Andersen, 2010; Andersen et al., 2010).  
 
Table 1. Core companies in the nanotechnology-enabled Danish window sector 
 
Company Corporate location 
(and affiliation) 
Key products Year established 
Fiberline 
Composites* 
Denmark Composite materials for 
buildings  and windmills 
1979 
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 The analysis draws on findings from the report Green Nanotechnology in Nordic Construction – Eco-innovation 
Strategies and Dynamics in Nordic Window Chains. See Andersen et al. (2010) for a further account of the 
methodology used and more detailed empirical analyses. 
Dyrop Denmark Paint  1928 
Accoat Denmark Coatings 1969 
Superwood*  (VKR Group, 
Denmark) 
Wood preservation (nano-
enabled) 
2002 
(VKR since 
2006) 
Photocat*  Denmark Nano photo-catalytic 
materials for glass and 
floors 
2009 
ScanGlass 
 
Denmark (affiliate of 
Saint-Gobain Glass, 
France) 
Glass processing, 
wholesale 
1935 
(Saint-Gobain 
since 1976) 
Pilkington Denmark*  Denmark (affiliate of 
Pilkington NSG 
Group, Japan) 
Glass wholesale and mirror 
processing,  
1978  
(NSG Group 
since 2006) 
Sunarc Technology*  Denmark Sheet glass (nano-enabled) 
for solar collectors, PV-
modules, greenhouses 
2000 
 
VELUX* (VKR Group, 
Denmark) 
Roof windows and 
skylights 
1941  
Dovista Group* -  
VELFAC and 
Rationel 
(VKR Group, 
Denmark) 
Vertical windows and 
doors 
1954 (Rationel) 
1961 (VELFAC)   
2004 (Dovista)  
PRO TEC 
Vinduer* 
Denmark Vertical windows 1993 
Source: Based on company webpages and interviews. *Companies of primary focus in the case. 
  
In examining the window sector, emphasis is placed on investigating how a traditional 
economic sector with a generally low rate of innovation reacts to the emerging science-based 
nanotechnology wave. Vertical specialization in the window chain is characterized by a few very 
large advanced multinational glass manufacturers, many small mostly traditional glass 
processing and window producers, and a range of project-oriented construction companies. The 
Danish innovation system itself is an example of a small innovation system – with few large 
multinational enterprises, relatively small universities, and low level of R&D – yet with a high 
overall innovative performance. This is not necessarily what the literature suggests would be an 
ideal environment for nanotechnology growth. What kind and extent of nanotechnology uptake 
can we expect in the Danish window chain? 
There is generally a low-level deployment of nanotechnology in the broader construction 
sector (Gann, 2003; Crisp/SPRU 2003; Bartos et al., 2004; Zhu et al. 2004; Fellenberg and 
Hoffschulz, 2006; Andersen and Molin, 2007; Geiker and Andersen, 2009). However, there is 
quite a high number of nanotechnology applications in the Danish window chain. Start-ups, the 
major multinational companies, and – perhaps most surprisingly – small to medium sized 
incumbents all play important roles in the development and uptake of nanotechnology in the 
window chain. Generally, nanotechnology is playing a surprisingly important and rising role for 
Danish glass and window innovation. There are important fully commercial nano-enabled 
products plus a variety of development projects and emerging new nanotechnology applications. 
This is all relatively unpublicized and represents a form of “silent innovation” in nanotechnology 
(a concept that is returned to later in the paper).  
 
4  Nano-innovation in the Danish window chain 
4.1  The glass producers and distributors 
The large glass producers represent the major channel through which nanotechnology is 
introduced into the window chain.
4
  Since the 1970s, the national offices or subsidiaries of the 
multinational companies Pilkington and Saint Gobain have dominated the Danish and Nordic 
glass supply and distribution markets. There is no float glass production left in Denmark. A 
further 29 mainly small companies deal with glass processing or wholesale activities in 
Denmark.  
Modern high-value products in the window sector are made from processing the basic 
float glass by laminating, toughening and coating, as well as assembling the glass into insulating 
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 This section draws on Andersen, et al., 2010, including interviews with Pilkington Denmark and VELUX, and web 
pages, company reports and secondary materials. Emphasis is placed on market developments as reported by 
Pilkington Denmark. 
glass units (double or triple glazing). Over the past 30 years, product innovation in the glass itself 
has focused on meeting a widening range of functionalities.  These include producing glass with 
improved performance in terms of thermal insulation, solar control (to reduce heat loss and 
regulate ventilation), security and safety, fire resistance, noise reduction, anti-reflection, self-
cleaning, anti-scratching, and visual appearance. Nanoscience has been used over these three 
decades in the development and application of coatings to offer improved glass performance 
features, evolving through incremental trial and error long before the recent buzz associated with 
nanotechnology but accelerating with the advance of modern nanoscience in the 1990s. Today’s 
coatings are multi-layer, up to 7 or more layers, to achieve multifunctional glass achieved either 
online (soft coatings) or offline (hard coatings). All modern flat glass coatings are based on 
nanotechnology.  
The multinational glass companies have taken the lead in developing advanced nano-
coatings. According to Pilkington Denmark, the competition in glass is intense and technology-
oriented.  Modern glass production is continuous, with large-scale mass production, and is highly 
capital intensive. Concentration in the sector is high. In 2004, the four largest global players – 
NSG (since 2006 including the large UK Pilkington Group), Saint Gobain Glass, Asahi and 
Guardian Industries – held a combined share of around 80% of the flat glass market in Europe.5 
All the big glass players have extensive R&D activities and a varied product portfolio in flat 
glass production directed at two major markets: the construction sector and the 
automotive/transport sector. Of the two, the construction sector is the largest market, taking 
about four-fifths for total glass output, but this sector is traditionally not innovative. The 
automotive/transport sector is more focused on innovation and is R&D intensive. Several of the 
                                                          
5
 Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1781, 2007. 
parent glass companies have extensive activities in other (non-glass) parts of the construction 
sector and – relevant for nanotechnology development – in materials and chemicals.6  
Pilkington spends around £33 million a year on R&D, organized within their two 
business lines of building products and automotive products. Additionally, Pilkington cooperates 
with the R&D labs of the parent Japanese NSG Group. Pilkington marketed the first self-
cleaning glass in 2001.
7
 This has garnered international recognition as one of the first 
commercially-available nano-consumer products. Within a year, PPG Industries, Cardinal Glass 
Industries and Saint Gobain also launched their self-cleaning glass products. Self-cleaning glass 
is now widely available in glass wholesalers’ product portfolios, although it still awaits a major 
breakthrough in market demand. 
Despite the publicity (“nano-fame”) associated with its self-cleaning glass, Pilkington 
does not officially refer to it as an application of “nanotechnology”. The term “nanotechnology” 
is generally avoided and instead they use the traditional term of “coatings”. The company 
maintains a low profile related to nanotechnology, and there is only little reference to 
nanotechnology in their materials information on their web page.
8
 According to Pilkington 
Denmark, their low profile is due partly to the unsettled debate on nanotechnology risk issues 
and partly because of the considerable uncertainty as to what nanotechnology is and what it is 
not. Examples of products that over-exaggerated their nanotechnology performance attributes 
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 See also Pilkington (2009a). 
7
 Self-cleaning glass cleans itself through photocatalytic processes. The Pilkington Activ brand by Pilkington uses a 
15 nm thick transparent coating of microcrystalline titanium dioxide. The coating is applied by chemical vapor 
deposition. Self-cleaning glass lowers maintenance requirements, reduces outside condensation (a rising problem in 
energy efficient houses), and saves detergents, water and energy use (Pilkington 2009b). 
8
 For Pilkington Activ, Pilkington says that: “Whilst the coating is nanometres thick it is really a development of thin 
film technology, rather than being a specific nanotechnology product. The name nanotechnology is usually applied 
to the scientific investigation or application of particles and/or structures which have sizes of less than one hundred 
nanometres. Particles or structures of this size can have unique properties compared with bulk materials. Pilkington 
Activ™ is based on a thin film of titanium dioxide rather than particles of titanium dioxide and the film is 
approximately 15 nanometres thick.” http://www.pilkingtonselfcleaningglass.co.uk/faq/technical/ (accessed 
February 2, 2011). 
(“nano-fakes”) have created negative reactions from customers. Pilkington currently sees no 
market advantage or profit opportunities in “nano-marketing” to emphasizing their product’s 
nanotechnology characteristics. This “silent” attitude to nanotechnology is shared by most of the 
other big glass companies. The term nanotechnology receives little attention in webpages or 
company reports. The exception is PPG (the world’s sixth largest glass producer), which markets 
itself as a nanotechnology company hence displaying a very different nanotechnology strategy 
from its other large competitors.
9
 
According to Pilkington Denmark, self-cleaning glass has failed to attract a high level of 
market demand. The market for flat glass is driven very much by regulation, but there is a lack of 
regulation that would generate demand self-cleaning features.  However, there is demand for 
other glass coating features. In particular, energy efficiency is a core and rising driver for glass 
innovation – and an area of substantial focus for policymakers and regulators over the last 20 
years. Low emissivity and solar control glass are standard offerings in today’s markets, achieved 
via soft nano-coatings. The potential market is huge since many countries primarily have one-
layer standard glass in their current building stock. Hard coating technology is important in the 
area of solar technologies, where the market is booming due to concerns about climate change 
and energy costs.  
Pilkington sees green demonstration houses as playing an important role for advancing 
radical product innovations in glass and windows. Radical innovations may be tested and 
funding is available for such projects. Pilkington Denmark sees the Nordic countries as being in 
the lead for taking up new advanced glass products and has therefore based its largest glass 
coating plant in Sweden. Yet, there are still barriers in marketing advanced glass innovations. 
                                                          
9
 See, for example: PPG, “Nanotechnology Enabled Materials for Energy Conservation,” presentation at EPA 
conference September 25, 2007 on Pollution Prevention through Nanotechnology, 
www.epa.gov/oppt/nano/p2docs/session4_rardon.pdf.  
Overall, the window and wider construction sector is not viewed as innovative and lacks new 
knowledge about glass. The construction sector is generally focused on production costs, while 
ongoing user costs are neglected. The builder, who typically will not live in the house, has little 
incentive for product innovation to reduce user costs. Since advanced nano-coated glass products 
have their advantages in the user phase, this is a major barrier for product innovation.  
Another entrant in nano-enabled glass is Sunarc, a small Danish up-start company.
10
 
Established in 2000, Sunarc specializes in the production of nano-structured anti-reflective 
surfaces on large glass sheets. The glass is aimed at niche applications within the markets for 
solar collectors, photovoltaic (PV) modules, and greenhouses and minimizes reflected light, 
hence improving light transmission. Sunarc uses a unique technology. Passing through several 
baths, the glass is subjected to a fully automated etching process. The resulting surface is a nano-
porous structure of approximately 100 nm thicknesses on both sides of the glass. This glass 
transmits six to eight percent more sunlight, depending on the glass slope. Sunarc has a 
somewhat relaxed approach to nano-marketing.  It does not actively market its products as 
nanotechnology products, but in company materials it does refer to itself as “a high-tech nano-
based company.”    
After a slow start, Sunarc has seen a steady increase in sales and exports, especially in 
recent years with increased interest in new solar technologies. In 2006, the company moved to 
new production facilities and received Børsen’s Gazelle award for being the second fastest 
growing company in Denmark. A new production line is planned, four new plants are being set 
up in other countries, and more are expected. The production facilities are not particularly 
expensive, so it is attractive to set up production where it is needed. Sunarc is considering 
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 This section is mainly based on interviews with a management representative at Sunarc.  
moving into low emissivity (low-E) glass production for buildings  - to improve light 
transmittance, which represents a problem in current 3-layer insulating windows. 
The capabilities underlying Sunarc’s production are mainly tacit and rest with core 
employees. The critical elements lie in the fine adjustment of the production process, which is 
essential to achieve a uniform high product quality. The company has chosen not to patent its 
technology. Others have tried to copy what they are doing, including the larger glass companies. 
However, although laboratory-scale production is easy, scaling-up to commercial levels is 
difficult, and Sunarc is still the leading full-scale global producer with this technology.   
 
4.2  The window producers 
The Danish window manufacturing industry is also an important entry point for 
nanotechnology in the window chain. This is surprising because the window industry is generally 
relatively small scale and is not popularly considered to be innovative. The Danish window 
industry consists of around 300 small producers, but is dominated by one large group, the VKR 
Holding Group. VKR has quite a high level of R&D and is the locus of most of the 
nanotechnology activities in the Danish window industry.   
VELUX is the dominant company within the VKR Group, with a well-known 
international brand and specializations in roof windows and skylights.
11
 Nanotechnology has 
long been of interest to VELUX because it plays an important role among a number of their 
suppliers and in the components of their products. VELUX has its own R&D department, which 
is divided into two sections, one for the frame and one for glass. Both sections are involved in 
nanotechnology R&D. They track developments elsewhere so that the company has the 
necessary capabilities to select the right products from their suppliers. For example, selecting 
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 This section is based on interviews with managers at VELUX and Dovista.  
glass features is a key competitive factor. Knowledge and insight about nanotechnology is 
especially important in the glass R&D section: they maintain dialogue with the major glass 
producers about their nano-coatings and are well informed about all details of these. 
Dovista, also part of VKR, is the holding group of the main two Danish producers of 
vertical windows, Velfac and Rationel. Dovista undertakes R&D for these two affiliates. In the 
past, Dovista was not focused on nanotechnology and did not undertake targeted searches into 
nanotechnology innovations. However, interest is now growing. In 2009, Dovista began their 
first nanotechnology R&D project, with a Danish university, aimed at reducing condensation 
problems of windows (which, as noted, is a major issue in increasingly energy efficient 
buildings). There is also cooperation between VELUX & and Dovista: they draw heavily on each 
other’s R&D and engage in common product developments and marketing. 
Over the last ten years VELUX’s interest in nanotechnology has grown alongside the 
general societal interest about nanotechnology. Since 2006, VELUX has participated in the 
nanotechnology background group of Danish Standards, working on risk issues, characterization, 
metrology, and related topics. VELUX is one of only a handful of Danish companies who 
participate in such work. From 2005 through to 2009, the company also participated in the 
Danish “NanoPaint” collaborative nanotechnology R&D project, which also involved paint, 
coating and chemical suppliers as well as Danish knowledge institutions. The project sought to 
develop nanotechnology surface coatings. VELUX was interested in more durable paint for 
wood as well as more environmentally friendly metal coatings, although the project had a limited 
outcome. According to VELUX, their main sources of knowhow are not research institutes but 
their varied major international suppliers who VELUX sees as being at the forefront of 
technological development, including for nanotechnology. 
Nano-coated multifunctional glass is stocked in VELUX’s product portfolio. Demand for 
high-energy performance is the core driver for glass product innovation over the last 20 years, 
especially during the last five to ten years. Low-E glass and solar control glass are standard in the 
markets VELUX sells to. Self-cleaning glass is also interesting to VELUX, since roof windows 
are difficult to clean. In some countries, it is offered as a standard window material, while in 
other countries it is an optional choice.   
VELUX does not undertake explicit nano-marketing and there is no information about 
nanotechnology content or production processes in product descriptions. Nanotechnology is seen 
as an R&D input rather than a product criteria. However, risk aspects are an issue they are 
attentive to in their nanotechnology strategy development. They see two poles in the 
nanotechnology community. The first focuses on health and environmental issues, claiming that 
nanotechnology is risky. The second maintains that there are no problems to stop pushing ahead 
with these promising technologies. VELUX seeks a middle way between these poles, keeping 
track of developments related to nanotechnology risks. 
The VKR Group has recently become engaged in nano-enabled product development for 
wood impregnation.
12
 VKR has long been looking for more environmentally-friendly wood 
preservation methods. In 2006, VKR bought Superwood, a Danish start-up company, which 
offers a nanotechnology-based and environmentally-friendly wood impregnation method using 
supercritical carbon dioxide (CO).
13
  The method is based on a 2001 patent. Superwood was 
started in 2002 as a buy out from FL Schmidth – a Danish-based global supplier to the cement 
and minerals industries. Superwood struggled with scaling up, and went bankrupt in 2003. 
                                                          
12
 This section is mainly based on interviews with managers at Superwood A/S and Dovista.  
13
 The Superwood method protects the wood all the way into the kernel. This gives boards a substantially longer 
lifespan. In addition, this method enables the impregnation of wood species such as spruce that cannot be 
impregnated using traditional methods. The technique is environmentally-friendly since it does not use toxic 
chemicals. 
Following VKR’s purchase of the company in 2006, VELUX, Dovista and Superwood are 
jointly engaged in further development of Superwood’s technology, targeted specifically to 
window products. The idea is to obtain durability due to anti-fungus treatment of the wood and a 
water repellent effect. The results are promising and they hope to start large-scale production of 
the Superwood frames soon. This product would be unique worldwide. In the meantime, since 
2006, Superwood-treated timber is available for general consumer use in construction, with the 
market for such green products expanding rapidly. Superwood markets its products as green 
products rather than nano-products. There is a reference to nanotechnology on the company’s 
web site, but it is not very visible.   
The most radical recent product innovation in the Danish window chain is the 
development of composite window frames to improve energy efficiency.
14
  While glass has 
become much more energy efficient the last 20 years, the window frames have not. The frames 
act as thermal bridges, a problem that is little recognized by users but which has been receiving 
policy attention. New more systemic policies (earlier policies were only directed at the glass) are 
creating incentives for innovations in frames. The first Danish composite product was developed 
by the small incumbent PRO TEC, with commercial success. Dovista has recently also engaged 
in developing similar products, with these applied so far in green demonstration houses. These 
green demonstration houses, built by many Danish municipalities, are seen as important sources 
of experimental product innovation. However, neither of the two composite products is nano-
enabled. PRO TEC’s composite supplier is Fiberline, but this company is not active in 
nanotechnology development and only possesses minor interests in nanotechnology. 
Recently, the VKR Group has undertaken an interesting strategic change, shifting from 
focusing on developing windows to acting as developers of buildings, more specifically energy 
                                                          
14
 This section is mainly based on interviews managers at Fiberline,  PRO TEC, and Dovista. 
efficient buildings. They increasingly see and market themselves as “producers of light and fresh 
air” rather than producers of windows. VKR serves as a lead actor in several green 
demonstration house projects, engaging in systemic, smart eco-innovation at the building level.
15
 
VKR seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to construct advanced green buildings with large 
window areas to address Danish energy regulations restricting the window surfaces.
16
 In so 
doing, they are replacing construction companies, taking on a new role as system integrators in 
the growing green building market. 
  
4.3  After-treatment producers 
A further nanotechnology entrant in the window chain is Photocat A/S
17
, a Danish start-
up company. Photocat produces nano-structured materials and coatings with photocatalytic 
properties, e.g. self-cleaning functions. Photocat has a product directed at the glass market, 
ShineOn® Pro, which is an aftermarket treatment to make window glass self-cleaning. The 
company is a spin-out from SCF Technologies A/S, a dedicated Danish nanotechnology 
company that from 2003 also specialized in supercritical technology, similar to Superwood.
18
  
SCF initially experimented with a range of applications for supercritical technology. SCF 
focused relatively quickly on bio-oil from organic waste, which is now the core focus of the 
company. In the advanced materials area, SCF focused on self-cleaning glass. For this  product 
SCF initially relied on imported nano-materials from China, but after encountering technical 
challenges the company began work to design its own nanoparticles leading to the development 
                                                          
15
 This entails integrating windows and blinds with electronic systems, innovative building design with optimal 
utilization of daylight and natural ventilation, combined with artificial light (including nano-based LEDs). 
16
 The Danish Building code (from 1979) regulated the energy consumption of a house by specifying the maximum 
surface area for windows (15%), as windows were considered heat losers compared to the rest of the building 
envelope. 
17
 This section is mainly based on interviews management of Photocat 
18
 SCF is a spin-out from FL Smidth , a Danish construction company –similar to the company Superwood  
of the patented ShineOn® product in 2005. This work was not based on supercritical technology 
but rather on nanoscale photocatalysis. Sets of nanoparticles are configured using pear mill 
technology (in cooperation with a German supplier) and the wet grinding of materials at the 
micro- to nano-scales. The end product for applying the window self-cleaning glass coating 
consists of two fluids as well as a set of recommended spray containers and education to ensure 
correct handling. Additionally, working with a Swedish floor company, Välinge Innovation, in 
2007, a new patented composite flooring material was developed (ActiFloor). Photocatalytic 
nanoparticles are integrated in the floor material matrix, the first of its kind. These floors are 
depolluting, improving the indoor climate (formaldehyde release is eliminated from the floor 
itself, while the floor also removes formaldehyde from other sources). With SCF seeking to 
focus on products other than self-cleaning materials, Photocat was spun-out in 2009, with plans 
to start industrial production of the floors in 2010. Meanwhile, ShineOn has been licensed by 
Photocat to wholesale companies in the UK and US, with moderate success. The users are 
professional glaziers and renovation companies. In Denmark marketing activities have been 
limited and no license partner has been found.  
Photocat promotes itself as a clean-tech nano-based company. As the nano wave is not as 
hot as earlier, nano-branding is less important to the company. However, Photocat is the 
company with the most explicit nano-oriented marketing in the Danish window chain. 
Documentation and external validation are seen as important by Photocat, addressing both 
quality and health and risk issues related to nanoparticles.
19
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 The Danish Technological Institute conducted an independent test which verified ShineOn’s self-cleaning 
properties, finding that they equaled the cleaning capacity of the well-known Pilkington and Saint-Gobain brands. 
All of Photocat’s products have material data safety sheets prepared in cooperation with experts and in compliance 
with regulations. 
The following sections consider the empirical findings in the context of strategies for 
nanotechnology entry and the Model III mode of nanotechnology development. 
   
5  Strategies for nanotechnology entry –  towards a taxonomy 
 
Nanotechnology is a generic and enabling technology which affects a very spectrum of 
companies in very different ways, most of which have been little analyzed to date. However, 
based on the evidence from the case studies of nanotechnology firms in the Danish window 
chain, a taxonomy is suggested which sheds light on important differences in firm strategies for 
nanotechnology. The taxonomy is based on three criteria: (1) the capabilities of the firm; (2) the 
firm’s role in technology generation and application; and (3) the strategic importance of 
nanotechnology to the core business activities of the firm. There are nine types of firms in the 
taxonomy. In order to illustrate the taxonomy, examples from the Danish window chain are 
referred to.  
The first three types of firms emerge out of the nanotechnology sector itself, namely: 
Category 1: the makers of instruments, equipment, facilities and software for nanotechnology 
production; Category 2: producers of generic nano-materials; and Category 3: producers of 
nano-services, e.g. specialized consultants who advise on aspects related to nanotechnology. 
Firms in these three categories enable other firms to develop and apply nanotechnology. Such 
firms have not in a visible or important way been involved in nanotechnology innovation in the 
Danish window chain, with the exception of the Photocat case where cooperation with the mill 
grinder supplier was important for the company’s nanotechnology innovation. 
The next set of firms is downstream, moving towards nanotechnology used. Category 4 
comprises dedicated nanotechnology firms (such as Superwood, Sunarc and Photocat) where 
nanotechnology makes up a fundamental part of the firms capabilities and innovative activities 
and it is applied to develop innovative (nano)products. Category 5 consists of nanospecialized 
firms where nanotechnology forms a serious but not central part of their capabilities. The 
multinational glass producers are leading nanotechnology developers within the construction 
area, but they also possess other important capabilities and lines of business. Category 6 
comprises nano-active firms, where nano R&D play a modest but not very central role for their 
innovative activities and capability development. An example is VELUX, whose nanotechnology 
innovation is mainly centered on applying and integrating nanotechnology developed by others. 
Category 7 consists of nano-explorative firms, with no development activities in nanotechnology 
but with interest and some level of research into nanotechnology opportunities (as for Pro Tec 
and Velfac/Dovista). Category 8 encompasses nano-tacit users with no R&D in nanotechnology 
themselves but applying nano-enabled products (e.g. many construction companies and 
architects). They may be more or less knowledgeable about the nano-content of their products. 
Finally, Category 9 contains what can be termed nano-shadow companies. Nanoscience  forms 
part of their underlying technology base and is applied in niche products by others in the sector. 
However, companies in this category have limited or nil efforts themselves in developing or 
applying nanotechnology. These companies are typically relatively high tech and are potentially 
nano-dedicated companies. An example of such a firm is Fiberline.  
 
6  Model III nanotechnology development: reflections and insights 
 
It appears that nanotechnology follows an intermediate model of technology development as 
compared to that of ICT (dominated by the large firms) and biotechnology (dominated by small 
spin offs). As discussed earlier, it is suggested that there is a Model III nanotechnology 
evolution, where nanotechnology commercialization is driven significantly by small and medium 
sized firms based on their internal know how and with larger firms as key knowledge suppliers. 
Model III small and medium sized firms are good at sensing new societal needs in the 
marketplace, which can form the germ for early nanotechnology commercialization processes. 
 
6.1  The distribution of nanotechnology capabilities in firm and market  
Nanotechnology has already affected the organization and operation of the window sector. Large 
companies play a central role, through the provision of nano-based coatings (by the large glass 
companies) and chemicals and metal materials. A small number of these large integrated 
organizations placed upstream have substantial nanotechnology capabilities which function as a 
source for firms further downstream. They are complemented by nano-dedicated start-up 
companies who, in the Danish window case, have developed several promising new nano niche 
products.  
This picture is consistent with Shapira et al., (2010) who suggest that both the large and 
the small firms play significant roles for nanotechnology development at the current stage. 
However, the Danish findings indicate that medium-size players in the Danish window industry 
(both in size and chain position) play a key role as integrators of a variety of nanotechnologies. 
Internal R&D combined with input from their large suppliers form the basis of their internal 
nano-capabilities. The recent observed strategic shift among mid-chain window producers from 
window to green building providers strengthens their roles as system integrators, indicating that 
they may become even more important carriers of nanotechnology commercialization in the 
future. 
While there seems to be a distributed set of nano-capabilities in the window chain, this 
case study also highlights (although without detailed examination) the widespread disinterest and 
lack of awareness among many of the smaller and medium-sized companies who dominate the 
construction sector. Even companies that are innovative in other domains (such as Fiberline) are 
not very engaged with nanotechnology.  
 
6.2  The systemic nature of the economic change 
At the technological level, there are as yet few signs of nano-enabled systemic innovations which 
require significant complementary innovations or new capabilities. An exception is soft-coated 
glass which requires special and quite delicate practices and capabilities among the processing 
customers. Since soft-coating is already a well-established technology, there are no immediate 
signs of innovation coordination needs caused by nanotechnology itself in the window chain. On 
the contrary, the nano-surface treatments, which are the most widespread nanotechnologies in the 
window chain, are valued by businesses because they can solve problems as an add-on, without 
interfering in existing products and production processes. Overall, the anticipated general 
purpose transformative effects of nanotechnology are not yet apparent, at least in the industry 
studied in this paper. 
 
6.3  Silent innovation and market development  
Clearly nano-commercialization is at an early and quite uneven stage of development. Some 
nano-enabled products have been available for a surprisingly long time (10 - 30 years). But most 
of the more interesting developments in the downstream part of the chain are of a relatively 
recent vintage.  
The paper has pointed to the “silent” nature of much of the nanotechnology market at the 
current stage. There has been a marked shift in the marketing strategies of firms engaged in 
nanotechnology innovation, from being quite “loud” or outspoken around the turn of the 
millennium about their nano-related activities and products towards becoming increasingly 
“silent” the recent years. Generally, most of the firms engaged in nano innovation in the Danish 
window chain pursue a discreet if not secretive strategy towards nanotechnology. This seems to 
be the case for all types of firms. Although the nano-dedicated startups are relatively most 
outspoken, even these firms hold back on over-emphasizing nanotechnology features in the 
marketing. 
These discreet strategies are largely due to the health and environmental risk issues that 
are associated with nanotechnology, but also reflect general uncertainty about the value of 
nanotechnology terms and features in the market. Outside of a few core producers and users, 
nanotechnology is not well-defined or understood. Nanotechnology innovation is thus often 
silent in the sense of it not being communicated to the market. Additionally, this is also internally 
related to R&D processes. Although there has been an evolution of nanotechnology from trial 
and error testing to more formal modeling, much nanotechnology is insufficiently codified. The 
nano-prefix is used flexibly, as and when it advantages firms. The lack of codification of 
nanotechnology partly explains the silent innovation in nanotechnology. But there is also 
deliberate strategizing, with firms knowing that they are applying nanotechnology to their 
processes and products yet choosing not to publicize this in the market. Overall, there is much 
nanotechnology applied in the window chain that is little communicated and not widely known. 
This trend reflects what might be viewed as a downward nano-wave, where nanotechnology 
faces reputation problems to such an extent that the “nano” hardly functions as a selection device 
on the market. Firms hesitate to enter the nano-market because of these reputation problems.  
The firms seriously engaged in nanotechnology innovation at the current early stage not 
only have to build up nanotechnology capabilities but also a nanotechnology business model. 
Part of this business model involves market-making – as firms have to invest in building nano-
specific market-supporting institutions such as standards, documentation and communication 
about quality and risk issues. Another part of this business model involves considering how to 
market nano activities and address social needs. The firms successful in nanotechnology seem to 
be those mastering and carefully implementing these aspects of nanotechnology management 
and strategizing. Small and medium sized companies seem to have an advantage here, with  
small nano-dedicated firms taking much of the early risk in nano marketing and thereby the 
establishment of the nano market. 
Nanotechnology appears to be strongly nested in sustainability issues. The green wave in 
the economy influences the uptake of nanotechnology in the window chain considerably. There 
is growing awareness of climate change and energy issues, including in the construction sector.  
But a proposition could be that nanotechnology is being positioned strongly as a solution to 
environmental and energy problems because of nanotechnology’s extraordinary need to 
outweigh possible nano-risks with societal benefits. Particularly in the embryonic stage, when 
there is uncertainty as to effects, there is a need to legitimize a new technology.  
It seems that the hype-nature of nanotechnology influences its economic development in 
mixed ways. The commercialization process is slowed down as silence about nanotechnology 
hampers the selection process. The long-term implications of silent nanotechnology innovation 
are uncertain. It may be that the nano-market will not greatly evolve, as technology remains an 
R&D “black-box” input which firms see no need to market. Or it could represent an intermediate 
stage that will evolve into stronger selection mechanisms as the nano market matures. On the 
other hand, the careful nano strategizing that has evolved, noticeably the serious early attention 
to risk issues and to documentation, may in the long run turn out to be a viable strategy. It may 
lead to the creation of informed and well-functioning markets for the new technology. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This paper has posited the need to put greater emphasis on the market formation side 
rather than the technology generation side in explaining early technology evolution. A Model III 
mode of nanotechnology evolution has been proposed based on an evolutionary capabilities 
perspective. This model suggests that nanotechnology commercialization is driven mainly by 
small and medium sized firms based on their internal knowhow, with large firms as important 
suppliers of knowledge. These smaller firms seem to be adept at addressing social needs and 
building nano-markets, the latter being a key factor in the nano-commercialization process. A 
taxonomy consisting of nine different types of enterprises engaged in nano entry has been 
proposed, illustrating the very diverse impacts of nanotechnology on firms.  
The paper points to a marked shift in market formation, where the “loud” phase of 
nanotechnology of earlier years has subsided into the current “silent” period. Small nano-
dedicated firms are those who bear the main risk of nano marketing, being relatively less silent. 
It seems that the hype features of nanotechnology have been important in not only shaping the 
institutional setting around nanotechnology but also in directly influencing its market formation, 
with the close nesting of nanotechnology with environmental issues. The silent nature means that 
“nano” has limited value as a selection criterion on the market, slowing down the 
commercialization process. However, findings from the Danish window sector do indicate a rise 
in nano-commercialization as more downstream applications appear in recent years. However, 
there is little broader attention and awareness to this form of nanotechnology commercialization 
and a lack of recognition of the significant nano-enabled eco-innovations that are occurring in 
the chain.    
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